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survey of donor officials
Haley J. Swedlund
Centre for Conflict Analysis and Management, Institute for Management
Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Under what conditions are foreign aid donors willing to suspend foreign
aid to punish political transgressions, such as election fraud, corruption
scandals or political repression? Prior scholarship has emphasized that
political sanctions, including foreign aid suspensions, are constrained by
the geostrategic considerations of donor countries. However, foreign aid
suspensions often occur in strategically important countries, and donors
respond differently to different types of political transgressions within the
same county. To shed light on this puzzle, in this article, I present evidence
from an original survey of top-level donor representatives in 20 African
countries, including a list experiment designed to elicit truthful responses
about the conditions under which donors are willing to suspend foreign
aid. I argue that the likelihood of a foreign aid suspension depends not
only on the strategic considerations of the donor government, but also on
the institutional incentives of the donor agency. A donor agency’s
institutional incentives are shaped by the agency’s organizational design,
as well as by its foreign aid portfolio in the recipient country.
KEYWORDS
foreign aid; political conditionality; aid suspensions; credible commitments;
Africa; elite experiments in IR.
INTRODUCTION
Citizens in donor countries have a strong preference for conditioning
foreign aid on good governance. Over 90% of respondents in the 2011
Eurobarameter, which sampled more than 25,000 individuals from
27 countries, expressed that foreign aid should be conditioned on
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democracy, human rights and governance (Bodenstein and Faust 2014).
But, how willing are aid donors to condition foreign assistance on good
governance? Given the strategic nature of foreign aid, can donor agencies
credibly threaten to suspend foreign aid, if a recipient government com-
mits a political transgression such as election fraud, corruption or politi-
cal repression?
In this article, I argue that political conditionality, or the willingness of
donors to condition foreign aid on governance (Baylies 1995), only works
when the institutional incentives of donor agencies are aligned to allow
the threats of donor agencies’ to be credible. By institutional incentives, I
mean how costly an aid suspension is to a donor agency in terms of orga-
nizational performance and reputation. Such incentives are shaped by
both the donor’s foreign aid portfolio in the recipient country, and orga-
nizational design features of the agency that make it easier or harder for
aid to be suspended.
Prior research largely assumes that the main constraint facing
political conditionality is the geopolitical motivations of donor countries
(e.g. Dunning 2004; Lebovic 2005; Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Nielsen 2013).
That is, donor agencies are unwilling to enforce good governance criteria,
because it is diplomatically and commercially costly to donor govern-
ments. However, donor agencies sometimes sanction recipient govern-
ments who are strategically important to donor countries, and donors’
strategic interests cannot explain why donor agencies respond differently
to different types of political transgressions within the same country.
The possibility that institutional incentives affect the likelihood of an
aid suspension occurs, because donor governments delegate the dis-
bursement of foreign aid to donor agencies (Gibson et al. 2005; Hawkins
et al. 2006; Martens 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2009; Ostrom et al. 2002;
Svensson 2006). Delegation to aid agencies means that institutional incen-
tives to suspend aid could – at least under certain conditions – supersede
strategic incentives on the part of donor governments not to suspend aid,
influencing how foreign aid diplomacy is practiced abroad.
To test the argument that institutional incentives have important con-
sequences on the willingness of donors to sanction political transgres-
sions, I collected original data on the likelihood of an aid suspension by
directly querying heads of development cooperation, commonly referred
to as HoCs, from 23 different donor agencies across 20 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. HoCs are the key interlocutors between donor agencies
and recipient governments and are responsible for negotiating and
implementing programming at the recipient-country level. In addition to
vignette questions that asked the HoC to indicate how likely it is that
their agency will suspend aid in a number of different scenarios, the sur-
vey included a list experiment designed to overcome social desirability
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bias and elicit truthful information regarding the willingness of their
donor agency to suspend aid following severe political repression.
Consistent with my argument, results from both the vignette questions
and the list experiment vary in important ways related to the institutional
incentives faced by donor agencies. First, respondents are more likely to
report that their agency would suspend aid, if the political transgression
directly affects the donor agency’s aid portfolio1 in the recipient country;
for example, if there is corruption in a project their agency is supporting.
Second, respondents report a greater willingness to sanction political
transgressions, if their agency provides direct budget support to the
recipient government. Third, respondents report a higher willingness to
suspend aid, if there are fewer domestic veto players that can block an
aid suspension decision.
My findings have important practical and theoretical implications for
scholars of foreign aid and international relations more broadly. Results
from the survey suggest that institutional incentives can affect how aid
diplomacy is actually exercised in recipient countries. Contributing to a
‘bureaucratic turn’ in studies on foreign aid,2 my results provide us with
a richer understanding of when and where we might expect donor agen-
cies to actually sanction political transgressions by suspending aid. Most
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies formally condition their aid on
governance. However, our ability to measure the willingness of donor
agencies to suspend aid in response to a political transgression has been
limited with the data hitherto available. I draw on novel data that allows
us, for the first time, to directly measure the willingness of donor agen-
cies to suspend foreign aid following a political transgression. In addition
to highlighting the important role of institutional incentives in aid sus-
pensions, the study is an important step in measuring whether political
conditionality is actually effective. Aid suspensions punish recipients for
political transgressions by either partially or completely stopping the dis-
bursement of foreign aid. If donor agencies cannot credibly commit to
suspending aid in response to a political transgression, then we can
hardly expect recipient governments to be incentivized to improve gov-
ernance based on donors’ threats to suspend aid.
For scholars of international relations more broadly, my findings
emphasize the importance of understanding institutional incentives in
foreign policy decision-making. My results suggest that political con-
ditionality only works when institutional incentives are aligned in such a
way that donor agencies’ threats are credible. This finding is relevant
beyond the aid literature. In particular, the results have potential applica-
tion in the extensive debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions
(e.g. Baldwin 2000; Bapat and Kwon 2015; Drezner 2003; Hufbauer,
Schott, and Elliott 1990; Pape 1998; Peterson 2013). My findings suggest
that scholars interested in the effectiveness of sanctions, of which aid
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suspensions are one type, need to not only pay attention to the political
motives of states, but also to the institutional incentives of implementing
agencies.
Finally, methodologically, the article demonstrates the potential use-
fulness of elite survey experiments in foreign policy and international
relations. As Susan Hyde argues, ‘conducting experimental research
directly with elites is one way to make experiments in IR more realistic
and potentially more relevant’ (2015, 409). By directly surveying high-
level development practitioners, I am able to answer to offer a more pre-
cise answer to an important question long-debated by aid scholars, and
the use of a list experiment design allows me to address a major threat to
inference in the study of aid suspensions – social desirability bias.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I provide an overview of what
we know about politically conditionality and the willingness of donors to
suspend aid in response to political transgressions. Second, I make the
case for taking the institutional incentives of donor agencies seriously
when it comes to aid suspensions and present three testable predictions.
Third, I provide a brief overview of the survey and the type of data it can
provide. Fourth, I evaluate my argument using original survey data.
Fifth, I provide an external validity check of the data by comparing my
survey results to actual suspension data. Finally, I conclude by outlining
the implications of the study and providing suggestions for future
research.
THE POLITICS OF AID SUSPENSIONS
Following the end of the Cold War, almost all donor agencies began for-
mally conditioning their aid on governance (Carothers and de Gramont
2013). Even aid agencies that deliberately avoid formal democratization
criteria, such as the World Bank, condition aid on good governance,
emphasizing sound public financial management and the protection of
basic human rights (Lebovic and Voeten 2009). But, can aid agencies
credibly commit to suspending aid following political transgressions by
recipient governments? Does aid conditionality actually work?
POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AND AID SUSPENSIONS
The effectiveness of political conditionally has drawn a great deal of
attention from scholars. In the 1990s, many scholars took a critical per-
spective, emphasizing that donors often appeared unwilling to enforce
conditionality.3 At the turn of the century, the focus shifted to aid selec-
tively. Evidence from this body of literature is mixed.4 There is some evi-
dence that select donors reward democratic and democratizing states
with higher volumes of aid at different periods of time (Bermeo 2011;
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Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout 2009; Dunning 2004; Freytag
and Pehnelt 2009; Hout 2007; Reinsberg 2015), and several scholars find
that donors are more willing to condition certain types of aid – namely
aid given directly to the recipient government – on governance perfor-
mance (Clist, Isopi, and Morrissey 2012; Dietrich 2013; Nielsen 2013; Win-
ters and Martinez 2015). However, others conclude that the salience of
governance in the recipient country frequently takes a backseat to the
strategic interests of donor countries (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Carey
2007; Hook 1998; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Younas 2008). Some
scholars even argue that corrupt governments might get more aid (de la
Croix and Delavallade 2013; Easterly 2008; Easterly and Williamson
2011).5
Despite an extensive bibliography, the literature on political condition-
ality is presently limited in two key ways. First, current methodological
tools make it difficult to capture whether a donor is willing to suspend
aid – that is to stop the release of aid already promised to a recipient
(either in part or in full) – in response to a particular political transgres-
sion. Cross-national studies of political conditionality have almost exclu-
sively relied on regression analysis to provide an estimated effect of
yearly changes in a country’s score on governance indicators – e.g. the
Freedom House Indicators or the Polity Index – on annual aid volumes.6
This approach highlights important trends in aid allocation, telling us
whether donors are willing to reward or punish recipients for aggregate
gains in governance by increasing or decreasing the amount of aid a
recipient is allocated in subsequent years. However, at least with the data
currently available, it cannot speak to the micro-foundations of aid sus-
pensions, because it is not able to capture in real time how donors
respond to particular political transgressions.
This is a big gap in our knowledge about political conditionality.
Although aid suspensions are only one of the tools at policy-makers’ dis-
posal (Hackenesch 2015; Koch 2015; Molenaers et al. 2015), they are vital
to the success of political conditionally. Without the ability to sanction
recipient governments by suspending aid, attempts to incentivize recipi-
ent governments to uphold good governance principles based on the
promise to suspend aid if certain conditions are not met will most cer-
tainly be less effective. Recipient governments work closely with donor
agencies over many years. If donor agencies do not follow through with
their threats to suspend aid in response to specific political transgres-
sions, recipient-country officials are unlikely to be compelled to change
their governance practices on account of such threats.
The second limitation is theoretical. Thus far, scholars have largely
assumed that enforcement of political conditionality is mainly limited by
the strategic interests of donor governments, emphasizing the political
and commercial uses of aid (Lancaster 2007; Milner and Tingley 2013).
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However, donors suspend aid even in countries that have a high level of
strategic importance. For example, in November 2007, the United King-
dom’s Department for International Development (DfID) suspended
£20 million of foreign aid to Pakistan in response to the government’s
decision to declare a State of Emergency and issue a provisional constitu-
tional order (DfID 2008). Similarly, in November 2010, DfID delayed a
payment of £85 million to Afghanistan because of concerns about finan-
cial management and accountability (DfID 2011). In both cases, the UK
had important strategic interests in the recipient country. Nonetheless,
aid was suspended.
Strategic motivations are also unable to explain variations in how
donors respond to different types of political transgressions within the
same country. Take, for example, Uganda: a key ally for Western coun-
tries in the fight against terrorism in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.
Despite Uganda’s strategic importance, political transgressions by the
Ugandan government have resulted in multiple aid suspensions over the
past decade. In 2013, donors suspended over $100 million dollars in for-
eign aid in response to the passage of a bill that punished some homosex-
ual acts (Reuters 2014). The bill was widely reported on and condemned
in the international media. This suspension, however, was relatively
minor compared a suspension that took place the year before when it
was discovered that $11 million in donor funds had disappeared from an
account held by the Office of the Prime Minister. Even though the theft of
funds was discovered and reported to donors by the Ugandan govern-
ment, donors suspended over $300 million in direct budget support to
the government (Government of Ireland 2012). This caused a huge hole
in the national budget, infuriating the Ugandan government (Swedlund
2017). Why were international donors willing to suspend over three times
as much aid in response to the corruption scandal?
DELEGATION AND INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES
The delegation of aid disbursement to aid agencies opens up the possibility
that institutional incentives influence the willingness of donors to sanction
political transgressions by suspending foreign aid. In Uganda, donors
reacted so strongly to the corruption scandal, because the disappearance of
the aid money reflected poorly on donor agencies that were directly sup-
porting the Uganda government via cash transfers.7 The scandal was partic-
ularly embarrassing for Irish Aid, as Ireland was at the time facing a
domestic financial crisis. For several days after the scandal broke, the Irish
papers were filled with news articles and editorials about the missing aid
funds. Because donor programming had been directly affected, it would
have looked irresponsible not to suspend.8 In contrast, although reprehensi-
ble to many international donors, suspending aid because of the
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anti-homosexuality bill would have disrupted projects and programs that
were in many cases substantively unrelated to the transgression.
While agency problems are rarely mentioned in the literature on politi-
cal conditionality, it is well documented that institutional incentives can
affect the quality and sustainability of foreign aid (Gibson et al. 2005;
Martens 2002; Ostrom et al. 2002; Svensson 2006). Agency problems arise
during aid distribution, because responsibility for disbursement is dele-
gated to agencies whose preferences do not directly align with donor
governments (e.g. Bush 2015; Gibson et al. 2005; Hawkins et al. 2006;
Martens 2002). We know, for example, that policy conditionality is often
not enforced because of a ‘pressure to disburse’ (Ostrom et al. 2002;
Svensson 2006). Donor agencies seek to maximize their aid budgets and
are therefore incentivized to keep disbursing, even if the recipient fails to
meet the conditions of the loan or grant.9 This creates a moral hazard
problem, allowing recipient countries to put off promised reforms.10
In the event of a political transgression, institutional incentives on the
part of donor agencies often overlap with the strategic interests of donor
governments not to suspend aid. Suspending aid means that develop-
ment programs have to be stopped mid-stream. Not only is this often
undesirable from a developmental perspective, it is practically difficult
to do in cumbersome, bureaucratic organizations like aid agencies
(Brown 2005). Knowledge has to be filtered up and then acted upon.11 In
addition, once suspended, it can be difficult to restart aid programs,
which can adversely affect the amount of aid allocated to the agency in
the future. As Ostrom et al. explain, ‘A nearly universal pressure exists
within almost all development agencies…to spend the money that is allo-
cated in one budgetary cycle, as parliamentarians are likely to interpret
unallocated funds as evidence that their funds are not needed’ (2002, 70).
Importantly, however, there may also be cases where the strategic
interests of the donor country and the institutional incentives of the
donor agency clash. For example, because of bad press, a donor agency
may find it costly not to suspend aid, even if the donor country considers
the recipient government to be an important political ally. Similarly, a
donor agency may find its work in a recipient country compromised by a
political transgression, such as corruption, and thus find it costly to con-
tinue to give aid, even if, all other things being equal, the donor govern-
ment would prefer not to suspend aid. My interest is in these cases, as it
is here that we should see important variations in the willingness of
donor agencies to sanction political transgressions.
HYPOTHESES AND OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS
If institutional incentives matter for the willingness of donor agencies to
uphold political conditionality, I predict that donor agencies will be
460
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
more likely to suspend foreign aid in three circumstances: (1) if the politi-
cal transgression committed directly affects the agency’s aid portfolio in
the recipient country, (2) if the donor agency provides direct budget sup-
port to the recipient government, and (3) if there are fewer veto players
that can block an aid suspension.
A donor agency’s combined set of projects and programs in a given
recipient country are collectively referred to as their aid portfolio. As we
saw in the case of Uganda, there is variation in how directly different
types of political transgressions affect a donor agency’s aid portfolio. In
some cases, the political transgression may be normative upsetting to
donor officials but does not directly affect their agency’s work in the
recipient country. In other cases, the political transgression may affect
the donor agency’s ability to pursue its main objective: the disbursement
of aid. I expect donors to be more sensitive to the latter types of political
transgressions.
H1 – A donor agency is more likely to suspend foreign aid if the political trans-
gression directly affects its aid portfolio in the recipient country.
Imagine that corruption is discovered in a project a donor agency is
supporting in a given recipient country. Not only has the project, which
the donor agency would presumably like to be successful, been compro-
mised, it would look irresponsible for the donor agency not to suspend
aid after corruption has been reported. Not suspending aid could not
only result in bad press but may even lead to a decrease in the amount of
money that the donor agency is allocated in the future. Alternatively,
imagine that the same recipient government is accused of preventing
opposition parties from registering for parliamentary elections. While
donor officials may normatively object to the government’s actions, their
aid portfolio has not been directly compromised. Thus, we can expect
that there are fewer institutional incentives to suspend aid.
In previous studies, the distinction between political transgressions
that directly affect a donor agency’s aid portfolio and those that do not
has been systematically overlooked. The hypothesis is, however, consis-
tent with anecdotal evidence by Fisher (2015), who observes that, in the
case of the UK, corruption is more likely to lead to an aid suspension
than other transgressions. It is also consistent with actual donor policies
regarding aid suspensions. While many donor agencies have explicit pol-
icies regarding aid sanctions in the case of poor fiscal management, they
typically lack clear policies when it comes to political governance prob-
lems. Norway, for example, has a zero-tolerance policy on financial irreg-
ularities. All recipients of Norwegian funding are required to incorporate
this policy into their financial and administrative procedures, and there
is a special unit within the Norwegian aid agency (NORAD) that man-
ages all cases related to financial irregularities and operates a
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whistleblower hotline.12 In comparison, its policies for suspending aid on
account of political governance or human rights violations are much less
specified and open to interpretation.13
There may be, however, certain circumstances under which donor
agencies are more likely to suspend aid more broadly. Agencies that pro-
vide budget support disburse resources directly into the treasury of the
receiving country, allowing the recipient to use their own allocation, pro-
curement and accounting structures (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser
2006). Instead of walling off funds in self-standing project accounts,
when they provide budget support, donors directly fund the recipient
government (Swedlund 2013, 2014). As a result, all other things being
equal, any type of political transgression by the recipient country should
implicate the donor’s programming in the country more than if the aid
was being provided through stand-alone projects. As a donor official
working in Ghana explained, when a donor agency provides budget sup-
port and things go ‘off-track’, their agency is implicated.14 In contrast,
donor agencies that do not provide budget support are less likely to be
held responsible for the political transgressions committed by the recipi-
ent government.
H2 – Donor agencies are more likely to suspend foreign aid if they provide bud-
get support to the recipient government.
This prediction is consistent with recent cross-national findings that
donor agencies are more willing to condition economic program aid on
governance (Clist, Isopi, and Morrissey 2012; Dietrich 2013; Nielsen 2013;
Winters and Martinez 2015). It is also consistent with empirical observa-
tions that donor agencies are more frequently held accountable for
directly supporting governments that commit political transgressions,
and that design features of budget support often give donors more lee-
way to suspend for political reasons (Faust and Koch 2014; Molenaers
2012).15 Finally, anecdotally, it helps explain the strong reaction by bud-
get support donors to the aforementioned corruption scandal in Uganda.
It would have looked highly irresponsible for budget support donors not
to suspend aid, because the scandal highlighted the vulnerability of the
budget, which was being partially funded by aid, to fiscal misuse (Swed-
lund 2017).
We should not expect, however, that all donor agencies should sus-
pend aid in equal measure, even if the political transgression is similar.
In comparative studies of foreign aid, ‘donors’ are often discussed as if
they are a monolithic group. However, donor agencies are organized in
many different ways, and these variations in design can moderate the
incentives of donor agencies to comply with the strategic preferences of
the donor government (Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015). In
some cases, it may be organizationally more difficult for a donor agency
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to suspend aid even if, all other things being equal, the donor agency
would prefer to suspend aid. In particular, I predict that donor agencies
with fewer veto players should suspend aid more often.
H3 – Donor agencies are more likely to sanction political transgressions if there
are fewer veto players that can block an aid suspension.
According to Tsebelis (1995, 2002), the more individual or collective
actors that can block changes to the status quo – i.e. the number of veto
players – the less likely there is to be a change in policy. If we apply
Tsebelis’ logic to aid suspensions, the status quo is a planned disburse-
ment of aid, i.e. the failure to suspend aid. Donor agencies with fewer
veto players should be more likely to suspend aid following a political
transgression, because there are less opportunities for either institutional
or strategic interests to get in the way of a suspension.
The precise number and type of veto players are likely to vary consid-
erably across donor agencies. However, as a first test of this argument,
we can distinguish between three types of donor agencies: (1) multilat-
eral donors agencies, (2) bilateral donor agencies with a minister for
international development (ministerial bilaterals), and (3) bilateral donor
agencies without a minister for international development (non-ministe-
rial bilaterals). Suspending aid following a political transgression should
be the most difficult for a multilateral agency, because there are many
potential veto players, all of whom have multiple incentives – both strate-
gic and institutional – not to suspend. Alternatively, ministerial bilaterals
should be the most likely to suspend, because responsibility for develop-
ment cooperation rests with a singular high-ranking, political appointee –
the minister of international development. Therefore, if they opt to devi-
ate from the status quo and suspend foreign aid, it should in principle be
easier for them to do so. Non-ministerial bilaterals should fall somewhere
in between.
To clarify this argument, it is useful to look at how aid suspension deci-
sions are made in these three different types of agencies. At the European
Commission, a multilateral aid agency, it is the European Council –
which is composed of ministers from each member state – that under-
takes the decision to suspend aid.16 This means that any suspension deci-
sion has to overcome a number of potential veto players (all of which are
collective veto players, according to Tsebelis’ logic). Similarly, at the
World Bank, it is the Board of Executive Directors (appointed by the
Board of Governors) that must green light suspensions. In terms of day-
to-day management, the board has delegated a great deal of authority to
the World Bank’s management. However, the board is still ultimately
responsible for approving financial packages and therefore must sign off
on any changes in approved packages, including aid suspensions.17 This
opens up the possibility that one or more member states could block a
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suspension, decreasing the likelihood that the agency will actually sanc-
tion a recipient government following a political transgression.
In contrast to multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies act on behalf of a
single donor country, effectively reducing the number of potential veto
players. However, donor countries organize their bilateral aid programs
differently. In some donor countries, a dedicated minister for interna-
tional development oversees foreign aid. The Danish Minister for Devel-
opment Cooperation, for example, is charged with ‘coordinat[ing]
Denmark’s participation in international negotiations relating to develop-
ment policy issues’ and ‘administer[ing] the Danish State’s bilateral and
multilateral development cooperation’ (Government of Denmark 2012,
1). In this capacity, the minister is the ultimate arbitrator of decisions
regarding aid disbursements. Similarly, in the UK, decisions about aid
disbursement – including aid suspensions – are ultimately the preroga-
tive of the minister responsible for development cooperation.18
In contrast, in non-ministerial bilaterals, foreign aid is managed by subor-
dinate agencies that are subject to oversight by many different domestic
actors, all of which could potentially veto an aid suspension. In the United
States, for example, the majority of aid is disbursed through the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID);19 a sub-cabinet
agency that takes foreign policy guidance from the executive branch via the
Secretary of State and is closely monitored by the United States Congress
(Lancaster 2007; Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005). Similarly, in France, aid is
jointly managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and the Agence Franc¸aise de Developpement (AFD), with the
executive playing a significant role (de Felice 2015). The same goes for Aus-
tria, where suspension decisions require a concerted decision by the manag-
ing director of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Austrian
ministry of foreign affairs, executive staff members of ADA and even other
donors.20 In each of these cases, the number of veto players who can chal-
lenge aid suspension decisions is greater than inministerial bilaterals, where
ultimately it is the minister who decides whether or not to suspend aid.
When it comes to aid allocation, independence from the executive should
increase a donor agency’s ability to pursue developmental objectives (Arel-
Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015). Alternatively, I am arguing that bilat-
eral agencies that are overseen by aminister for international development –
political appointees andmembers of the ruling party’s cabinet – should find
it easier to sanction recipient governments for political transgressions. In the
case of an aid suspension, what is required is a change in the status quo.
Under these circumstances, it is the number of players who can potentially
block an aid suspension that should be important.
One important question raised by this hypothesis is, to what degree is
it the strategic orientation of the donor that influences the bureaucratic
setting or vice versa? Certain aid agencies are arguable designed to allow
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them to have more freedom, while others are more dependent on con-
sent from political actors. My argument is that political conditionality
only works when the institutional incentives of donor agencies are
aligned to allow donor agencies’ threats to be credible. That is, I am
not arguing that institutional incentives are the only factor driving aid
suspensions, but rather that, at times, institutional incentives can over-
come strategic motivations not to suspend aid because delegation, by
design or not, allows agencies to bypass strategic motivations that
decrease the likelihood of a suspension. The inclusion of three distinct
hypotheses allows me to test this argument in diverse ways.
DATA AND METHODS
Between March 2013 and July 2014, I carried out an original survey of
high-level donor representatives working at the recipient-country level.
My survey targeted HoCs, or the senior civil servant working at the
recipient-country level for a particular donor agency.21
The fact that donor officials are not widely studied is a missed oppor-
tunity (Brown 2011); they are the human face of donor agencies and thus
have important insights into the practices and behaviors of donors. HoCs
are a particularly interesting group, because they are the key interlocu-
tors between the donor agency and the recipient government and are
responsible for negotiating and implementing programming at the recip-
ient-country level.
In regards to aid suspensions, HoCs working at the mission level are in
an excellent position to tell us under what conditions their employer – the
donor agency – is likely to suspend aid. A HoC is typically not the one
who makes the final decision to suspend aid. However, as the core repre-
sentative of a donor agency in a recipient country, the HoC is the donor
official who has the most information about the actual likelihood of an
aid suspension in a particular recipient country. Take, for example, the
UK. While suspension decisions are ultimately ministerial, decisions are
undertaken based on the advice of the head of office (DfID’s HoC equiva-
lent). As the head of development cooperation for a given recipient coun-
try, HoCs have considerable discretion in reporting and evaluating
changes in the political environment and in recommending a course of
action to the agency’s headquarters. Surveying donor officials working at
headquarters would likely over-represent an agency’s willingness to sus-
pend aid, because headquarter staff would only be able to answer ques-
tions about aid suspensions based on their knowledge about formal rules
and guidelines rather than their personal experience working in the
recipient country. At the same time, staff members working on specific
initiatives at the mission level may not have the broad knowledge about
the agency’s development program as a whole and/or the knowledge
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about how disbursement decisions are made to be able to sufficiently
answer questions about aid suspensions.
In total, 114 HoCs from 23 different donor agencies in 20 recipient
countries participated in the survey for a response rate of 53%. The
survey took respondents approximately 20 minutes to complete.22
Respondents in Francophone countries were given the opportunity to
complete the survey in either French or English. Potential respondents
were told upfront that all data collected would be anonymized and
not associated with either their name or their agency’s name.23
Tables A1 and A2 provide a more extended description of the sample,
including the number of respondents per recipient and donor coun-
try.24 Given that the survey was carried out in sub-Saharan Africa,
one concern might be that the continent’s heavy reliance on aid would
mean that aid agencies have a stronger influence over government
policies in the region. To account for this, in my sampling strategy,
I selected countries with a wide range of aid dependence (see
Table A1).
It is worth underscoring that data from survey do not tell us what the
HoC actually thinks his or her agency should do in a given situation.
Rather the questions are designed to gauge what the respondent believes
their agency is likely to do in a given scenario. Thus, the results are not
indicative of the preferences of the respondent, who may believe that aid
should be suspended but is not likely to be, or vice-versa. Instead, the
data should be interpreted as depicting what respondents believe will
happen based on their (often extensive) experience working in the field
of international development.25
UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS CAN DONOR AGENCIES
CREDIBLY COMMIT TO SUSPENDING AID?
The survey included two sets of questions on the willingness of donor
agencies to suspend aid in response to a political transgression: a set of
vignette questions designed to measure variation between how donors
respond to different types of political transgressions and a list experi-
ment designed to account for potential social desirability biases. If the
institutional incentives of donor agencies have important consequences
for aid conditionality, then I expect the results to vary based on whether
the political transgression directly affects the aid portfolio of the donor
agency (H1), whether the donor agency provides budget support to the
recipient government (H2), and whether there are fewer veto players
that can block an aid suspension decision (H3). In this section, I first pres-
ent the logic and results from the vignette questions, before turning to the
design and results of the list experiment.
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DONORS’ WILLINGNESS TO SUSPEND AID
I first asked survey respondents about the probability their agency would
suspend aid in a number of different scenarios. The logic behind this
approach is very straightforward. I wanted to know how HoCs believed
their agency would respond to different types of political transgressions.
Therefore, I asked them to indicate how likely their agency was to sus-
pend aid conditional on different types of political transgressions. The
question was phrased as follows:
For each of the following events, how likely is it that your agency
would suspend aid to [Country X] if the event occurred in [Country
X] at some point in the future?
A: moderately fraudulent elections
B: corruption scandal in a project your agency is supporting
C: deterioration in the investment climate
D: changes in headquarter priorities
E: highly fraudulent election
F: deterioration in respect for civil liberties
G: corruption scandal in the government at large
In the individual surveys, [Country X] was replaced with the name of
the country where the respondent was working (i.e. Uganda), and the
different scenarios were randomized. The response options were
unlikely, moderately likely or very likely. In the analysis, I rely on the
results for ‘very likely’, as any potential respondent bias should be lower
in this category. While respondents may feel pressured to avoid admit-
ting that their agency would not suspend aid in certain scenarios, they
should feel less pressure to select that their agency is very likely to sus-
pend aid.
In addition to the governance scenarios, I also included the options
‘changes in headquarter priorities’ and ‘deterioration in the investment
climate’. I included the option regarding headquarter priorities, because
I was interested to see which scenarios would be more or less likely to
lead to a suspension when compared to this relatively mundane (but fre-
quent) bureaucratic event. I included the option on investment climate as
a measure of the commercial incentives of the donor country, which
many suggest influence aid allocation decisions.
Consistent with H1, HoCs report that donor agencies are more sensi-
tive to transgressions that directly affect their aid portfolio (see Figure 1).
Only 17% of those surveyed responded that deterioration in the respect
for civil liberties was very likely to lead to an aid suspension. This is
roughly equivalent to the proportion of HoCs indicating that a change in
headquarter priorities is very likely to result in their agency suspending
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aid. In comparison, 53% of HoCs reported that corruption in a project
their agency is supporting is very likely to lead to an aid suspension. If
the corruption takes place in the government-at-large, only 36% HoCs
reported that their agency is very likely to suspend aid. These results are
consistent with my argument about institutional incentives. Corruption
in the government-at-large may or may not affect the agency’s portfolio
in the country, while corruption in a project the donor agency supports
clearly affects the agency’s activities in the recipient country.
Interestingly, 38% of HoCs report that a highly fraudulent election is
very likely to lead to an aid suspension. While somewhat surprising, this
finding is not inconsistent with my argument that agencies are more will-
ing to suspend in scenarios where day-to-day operations are affected.
Highly fraudulent elections can have enormous reputational costs for the
aid agency, particularly if the donor agency is funding parts of the elec-
toral process. The results are particularly interesting when one considers
that only 2% of respondents (only 2 out of 86) report that moderately
fraudulent elections are very likely to lead to a suspension. In the real
world, how election fraud is described and understood by donors and
the public may vary considerably from case to case, even if the facts are
similar. If aid agencies have a preference for continuing to provide aid,
they may be incentivized to downplay the degree of election fraud.
Only 1% percent of HoCs report that a suspension is very likely in the
case of deterioration in the investment climate. While this finding does
not discredit the idea that commercial interests can drive decisions about
aid allocation,26 it does suggest that the donor officials surveyed do not
believe that countries with a declining investment climate are likely to be
1%
2%
17%
18%
36%
38%
53%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
deterioration in investment
climate (N=88)
moderately fraudulent elections
(N=86)
deterioration in respect for civil
liberties (N=86)
change in headquarter priorities
(N=88)
corruption in government (N=90)
highly fraudulent election
(N=89)
corruption in agency's project
(N=89)
Proportion of HoCs reporting that their agency is ‘very likely' to suspend aid in several fictional scenarios with
95% confidence intervals for the population proportion.
Figure 1. HoCs assessment of the likelihood of an aid suspension.
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punished through aid suspensions. This adds further support to the
argument that strategic incentives are not the sole driver of aid suspen-
sion decisions.
If we break the scenario question down by whether or not the agency
provides budget support, as predicted by H2, we see clearly differences
between how the two groups of donors respond to political transgres-
sions (see Figure 2).27 HoCs working for agencies that provide budget
support to the recipient country in question are twice as likely to report
that their agency is very likely to suspend aid in the case of a highly
fraudulent election or a deterioration in respect for civil liberties. They
are also 15% more likely to report that their agency is very likely to sus-
pend aid in the case of government corruption. The pattern is slightly dif-
ferent for corruption discovered in an agency’s project. Here HoCs
working for agencies that do not provide budget support report being
more sensitive. Given that non-budget support agencies provide more
project aid, it makes sense that they would be more sensitive to this type
of corruption than budget support donors.
Finally, as predicted by H3, responses also vary based on the type of
donor agency the HoC works for (see Figure 3). Only 10% of HoCs work-
ing for multilateral agencies indicated that their agency is very likely to
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
deterioration in respect
for civil liberties
higly fraudulent
elections
corruption in
government
corruption in agency's
project
Provided Budget Support Never Provided Budget Support
Proportion of HoCs reporting that their agency is ‘very likely’ to suspend aid, by whether or not the 
agency provides budget support (with 95% confidence intervals for the population proportion).
Figure 2. Budget support donors are more likely to sanctions transgressions out-
side their own portfolio.
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suspend if there is deterioration in respect for civil liberties. Alterna-
tively, 18% of HoCs working for non-ministerial bilateral agencies and
25% of HoCs working for ministerial bilateral agencies selected that their
agency is very likely to suspend in this scenario. There is a similar pattern
for highly fraudulent elections.
The patterns are slightly different for corruption with non-ministerial
bilaterals reporting the most sensitivity to project-level corruption. In
practice, many non-ministerial bilaterals do not give budget support.
This is not likely to be a coincidence. Controversial aid modalities, such
as budget support, may also be less likely to be adopted if there are more
veto players. However, in the sample, the two measurements vary in
important ways that help to mitigate endogeneity concerns. First,
whether or not a donor agency provides budget support varies according
to whether or not a particular donor agency gives budget support to the
recipient country where the respondent is working, whereas the type of
agency (multilateral, ministerial bilateral or non-ministerial bilateral) is a
sample-wide measurement. Second, there are donor agencies that give
budget support but do not have a dedicated minister for international
development. For example, Japan gives budget support to three recipient
countries in the sample (Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia), but does not
have a minister for international development.28 Third, whether or not
an agency provides budget support is not limited to bilateral agencies, as
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
deterioration in respect
for civil liberties
higly fraudulent
elections
corruption in
government
corruption in agency's
project
Mulilateral Non-Ministerial Bilateral Ministerial Bilateral
Proportion of HoCs reporting that their agency is 'very likely' to suspend aid in several fictional scerarios, by 
agency type (with 95% confidence intervals for the population proportion).
Figure 3. Perceived likelihood of aid suspension varies by agency type.
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several multilateral donor agencies also provide budget support (in my
sample, the European Commission, the World Bank and the African
Development Bank).
TOLERANCE FOR POLITICAL REPRESSION
A significant challenge when directly asking donor officials about their
agency’s willingness to suspend foreign aid is social desirability bias. In
the vignette question, I try to limit potential social desirability bias by
ensuring the anonymity of the respondent and by focusing on the ‘very
likely’ responses. However, nonetheless, respondents might still be reluc-
tant to directly admit that their agency is unlikely to suspend aid, because
freely admitting this could possibly undermine the credibility of their bar-
gaining position vis-a-vis the recipient government. Given this concern, I
also carried out a list experiment designed to estimate the percentage of
donor-recipient dyads where the donor agency would be unwilling to sus-
pend aid even after an incident of severe political repression.
List experiments use an experimental design to elicit truthful responses
to a sensitive topic by circumventing respondent-related biases that
could arise from social desirability or privacy concerns (Blair and Imai
2012; Lavrakas 2014). In a list experiment, the respondent is not asked to
openly admit to holding a controversial belief (or in this case to admit
that their agency might act against its publicly stated principles). Rather
they are asked how many items are true from a list of statements that
includes a sensitive item. The mean response of the treatment group is
then compared to the mean response of a baseline group that received
exactly the same statements, minus the sensitive item. From a compari-
son of these two means, an estimate of how many respondents believe
the sensitive item to be true can be derived.29
Respondents in the baseline group were asked to indicate how many
statements were true out of a list of four baseline statements (designed to
avoid ceiling and floor effects).30 In addition to the baseline statements,
the treatment group was presented with the following sensitive item:
As long as the [Government of X] remains cooperative on our agency’s
main priorities, political repression (including suspected assassina-
tions of opposition leaders) would not lead to the suspension of aid.
In the individual surveys, [Government of X] was replaced with the
government of the recipient country in which the respondent was work-
ing (i.e. Government of Uganda). Whether or not the HoC was in the
baseline or treatment group was randomized, as were the statements.
I designed this question to be a strong test of the hypothesis that devel-
opment agencies have an incentive to continue providing aid despite a
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political transgression. The decision to focus on political repression and
to mention ‘suspected assassinations of opposition leaders’ was made in
order to present a vivid scenario to respondents that was clearly beyond
acceptable norms of behavior. I wanted the question to be both realistic
(hence the use of the word ‘suspected’), but also to clearly imply that,
while the recipient government had crossed a line, it remained coopera-
tive with the agency in other ways.
Using a difference-in-means estimator, I estimate from HoCs’ responses
to the list experiment that 45% of HoCs believe that their agency is
unlikely to suspend in the treatment scenario (see Table A3 in Appen-
dix).31 Using a one-sided permutation test, the hypothesis that no donor
representative affirmed the sensitive item (p D .017) can be rejected. If
close to half of HoCs report that a suspension is unlikely in the case of
severe repression, it seems reasonable to expect that suspension rates will
be even lower in more moderate cases of political repression.
An important consideration in the analysis of list experiments is the
assumption of no design effect; i.e. the assumption that inclusion of the
sensitive item had no systematic effect on respondents’ answer to the
central item. Using Blair and Imai’s (2012) test, I find no evidence of
design effects (see Table A4 in Appendix). There is also no evidence
of any systematic variation across key characteristics – i.e. the type
of agency, language of the survey, colonial history and mean length in
office – between the baseline and treatments groups (see Table A5 in
Appendix).
Just as with the vignette questions, results from the list experiment are
consistent with my argument about institutional incentives. Consistent with
H2, I estimate that 94.4% of HoCs representing agencies that do not provide
budget support to the given recipient country believe that their agency
would be unlikely to suspend in response to severe political repression.
Alternatively, the proportion of HoCs representing agencies that have pro-
vided budget support to the recipient country is just 20% (see Figure 4).
Consistent with H3, donor agencies with fewer veto players also report
that their agency is more likely to suspend aid following severe political
repression (see Figure 5). The estimated proportion of HoCs reporting
that their agency is unlikely to suspend aid in the case of political repres-
sion is over 71% for multilateral agencies, compared to 46% for HoCs rep-
resenting non-ministerial bilaterals and 8% for HoCs representing
ministerial bilaterals.
Results from the list experiment are thus consistent with the results
from the vignette questions, and my broader argument about the role of
institutional incentives in aid suspension decisions.
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Figure 5. Budget support donors are more willing to sanction political repression.
Figure 4. Willingness to sanction political repression varies by agency type.
473
SWEDLUND: ARE AID SUSPENSION THREATS CREDIBLE?
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
DO THE RESULTS MIRROR REAL-WORLD DECISION-
MAKING?
In both the vignette questions and the list experiment, respondents are
presented with several imaginary examples and asked how their agency
is likely to respond. Presenting respondents with a fictional scenario is
advantageous in that it helps us rule out exogenous factors that may
influence a donor’s decision to suspend or not suspend aid. Because
respondents are given only limited information about the hypothetical
situation, they have to make their decision based on the information pre-
sented to them. This allows us to know with greater confidence that the
decision to suspend is a result of the political transgression. However, it
also means that the results do not take into account a variety of other
potential factors not captured in the simple scenarios.
How then do we know that these results mirror real-life decision-mak-
ing regarding aid suspensions? One way to verify the accuracy of the
results is to look at actual cases of aid suspensions. Testing our predic-
tions using such data would require selecting on the dependent variable.
However, aid suspension data are useful for verifying that the patterns
observed in the survey mirror actual suspension decisions.
Most aid agencies do not publicly release data on aid suspensions. How-
ever, as an initial test, I obtained data from DfID, a ministerial bilateral
agency that provides budget support to many countries around the world.
In 2006, DfID began publicly reporting aid suspensions in accordance with
a new transparency law.32 Between 2006 and 2014, DfID reported 55
changes to their programming, of which 39 can be classified as an aid sus-
pension.33 Of these aid suspensions, only 10 were related to problems with
human rights or political governance. The remaining suspensions came
about because of poor fiscal management and/or corruption.34 In total, this
means that in 75% of the cases where DfID suspended aid between 2006
and 2014, the aid suspension occurred because of issues related to the integ-
rity of the program rather than problems with human rights or political
governance. These results are consistent with results from the vignette
questions suggesting that – at least on this measure – the results from the
survey are consistent with real-world decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS
How willing are donors to condition foreign assistance on good gov-
ernance? Given the strategic nature of foreign aid, can donor agencies credi-
bly threaten to suspend foreign aid, if a recipient government commits a
political transgression such as election fraud, corruption or political repres-
sion? In this paper, I argue that political conditionality only works when
the institutional incentives of donor agencies are aligned to allow the threats
of donor agencies’ to be credible. Using data from an original survey of
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high-ranking donor officials at the recipient-country level, I substantiate
this argument by providing evidence that donors are more willing to sanc-
tion political transgressions by the recipient government: (1) if the political
transgression directly affects the donor agency’s aid portfolio, (2) if the
donor agency provides budget support to the recipient government, and
(3) if there are fewer veto players that can prevent an aid suspension.
In future scholarship, it would be useful to test more detailed predic-
tions about donors’ willingness to suspend aid for specific donor agency–
recipient country dyads. A larger sample size that includes HoCs work-
ing in missions beyond Africa would make this possible and, at the same
time, add broader validity to the findings of the study. Nonetheless, the
study is an important first step in understanding when and where donor
agencies can credibly commit to sanctioning political transgressions by
suspending foreign aid.
Theoretically, my findings suggest that institutional incentives can
change how aid diplomacy is actually exercised in recipient countries.
Once aid is committed, disbursement is left to donor agencies, whose
preferences do not perfectly align with donor governments. Even if aid is
given largely for strategic reasons, the institutional incentives of donor
agencies may at times override the strategic preferences of donor govern-
ments. These findings have potential application beyond the aid litera-
ture, as they suggest that in contexts where decision-making is
delegated, institutional incentives can at times override the geopolitical
and commercial interests of states. They also speak to the broader ques-
tion of when and where political conditionality is likely to be effective.
Methodologically, the article demonstrates the potential usefulness of
elite survey experiments in foreign policy and international relations. By
directly surveying high-level development practitioners, I am able to pro-
vide a more precise answer to an important question long-debated in the
aid literature: how credible are the threats of donors to suspend aid? The
use of a list experiment design allows me to overcome possible bias from
social desirability pressures.
Practically, the findings not only help us to understand variation in aid
suspensions decisions, but also suggest that donor agencies can be
designed in a way to give them more independence over aid suspension
decisions. If the goal is to condition aid on good governance, the number
of potential veto players that can block an aid suspensions decision
should be limited. This means that donor countries, if they so choose, can
take steps to shield their foreign aid from political influences and increase
the credibility of threats to condition aid on governance. From the recipi-
ent-country perspective, my findings suggest that to maintain aid flows,
recipient governments should focus their attention on fiscal manage-
ment. Corruption, more than violations related to human rights or politi-
cal governance, is like to result in a suspension of foreign aid.
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NOTES
1. By aid portfolio, I mean a donor agency’s combined set of projects and pro-
grams in a given recipient country.
2. See, for example, Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter (2015), Cornell (2014)
and Gulrajani (2015).
3. See, for example, Crawford (1997), Collier et al. (1997), Killick (1998), Mosley,
Harrigan, and Toye (1995), Regan (1995), Sorensen (1993) and Stokke (1995).
4. This body of literature is closely linked with debates on whether or not
donors reward governments with better policies (e.g., Berthelemy and Tichit
2004; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Clist 2011; Dollar and Levin 2006), as well as
debates on the relationship between aid and governance (e.g., Bra€utigam
2000; Bra€utigam and Knack 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Die-
trich and Wright 2015; Goldsmith 2001; Jablonski 2014; Morrison 2007; Smith
2008; Svensson 2000; van de Walle 2001; Wright and Winters 2010).
5. For a summary of recent studies on the role of governance in determining
foreign aid composition, see Table 1 in Winters and Martinez (2015, 517). For
a summary (and classification) of studies linking aid to democratization, see
Kersting and Kilby (2014).
6. A notable exception is Molenaers et al. (2015).
7. Author interviews in Kampala, October 2013.
8. After the scandal, the EU Ambassador to Uganda remarked, ‘How can I now
go back to Europe and ask for aid for Uganda? The recent corruption scan-
dals are a breach of trust between the country and its development partners’
(quoted in Jeanne and Njoroge 2012, 2).
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9. At the World Bank, for example, not only are country loan officers under
pressure to meet country disbursement targets, there is a coordination prob-
lem in that staff are aware that it would not be financially productive to
make an example of a particular country by refusing to disburse funds. Pol-
icy conditionality can also conflict with other objectives, namely the goal of
providing quick-disbursing finance to limit potential loan defaults (Mosley,
Harrigan and Toye 1995).
10. See, for example, Azam and Laffont (2003), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Collier
(1997), Dollar and Svensson (2000), Hudson andMosley (2001) and Killick (1998).
11. For example, in the 1970s, the head of Norway’s development program in Tan-
zania reportedly discouraged aid personnel working on the ground from dis-
closing problems with the country’s forced villagization program (ujamaa),
because Tanzania had a special place in Nordic aid policy. Even once the issue
was taken up in Oslo, it took years before the full extent of the forced removals
was widely known, because donor officials were afraid that the situation
would be damaging to a still new aid system (Simensen 2007, 171).
12. Norway is not alone in having a whistleblower hotline. USAID, for example,
also manages a hotline for the reporting of fraud, waste and abuse in projects
sponsored by the agency.
13. E-mail exchange with Norad representatives, October 2014.
14. Interview with bilateral donor representative: May 2013; Accra, Ghana.
15. Most budget support programs include a set of underlying principles that are
almost always related to governance.
16. E-mail correspondence with the European Commission, January 2015. As an
example, see council decision 2002/148/EC, which suspended aid to Zim-
babwe in 2002. For more on how foreign aid works at the EC, see Schneider
and Tobin (2013).
17. In practice, the board does not typically ‘suspend’ aid but rather pulls financ-
ing or fails to renew financing. Following the anti-homosexuality bill, for
example, the Ugandan government could continue to borrow from the World
Bank but financing for health was pulled.
18. E-mail correspondence with DFID, September 2014.
19. In any given year, up to 15 different government agencies are involved in the
disbursement of aid in the United States (Tierney et al. 2011). The largest
amount of aid, however, flows through USAID.
20. E-mail correspondence with ADA, November 2014.
21. Official names for HoCs vary by donor. Within UNDP the equivalent would be
the resident representative, while at the World Bank it would be the country
director. Most bilateral agencies have a Head of Cooperation or Head of Develop-
ment Cooperation. This position is different from the ambassador, who is respon-
sible for the political relationship between the two countries. Instead, the HoC is
responsible for the country’s development portfolio in the recipient country.
22. A full draft of the survey protocol is available at: http://haleyswedlund.
com/files/SurveyProtocol.pdf.
23. The most difficult part of the survey process was identifying potential
respondents, as many aid agencies are less than transparent. After the names
and e-mails of the HoCs in a particular country were collected, an e-mail
requesting participation was sent. Potential respondents were sent up to five
e-mails requesting their participation; one approximately every week for
four weeks and a final reminder before the survey closed. In addition, in
some of the Francophone countries, respondents were also sent an additional
e-mail in French to see if this would increase response rates. (It did not.)
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24. Only traditional, OECD-DAC donors and affiliated multilateral institutions
were sampled. Accordingly, responses cannot be considered representative
of how donor officials from non-traditional donor countries, such as China or
Brazil, might respond.
25. On average, respondents reported holding in their current position for 24.7
months (s.e. 1.5 months). Thus, respondents were not, on average, new to the
position or the recipient country. (Country postings for donor staff are gener-
ally 3 to 4 years with postings for ‘hardship’ countries being considerably
shorter at 1–2 years.)
26. A donor country may still choose, at least in part, to provide aid to a particu-
lar recipient country for economic reasons.
27. In the ’budget support’ category, I include HoCs that selected that their agency
is currently providing budget support, as well as HoCs that selected that their
agency provided budget support in the recent past. The latter category is quite
small and theoretically, it makes more sense to include them with current bud-
get support donors; the overwhelming majority reported that they ended bud-
get support because of a political transgression by the recipient government.
The results do not change when this group is dropped from the sample.
28. Japanese development cooperation falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which has an International Cooperation Bureau overseen by a director-general.
29. Political scientists have used list experiments to address several sensitive
topics, such as race relations, support for militant groups, and support for
female political candidates (Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011; Kuklinski et al.
1997; Streb et al. 2008).
30. Respondents were instructed to ‘Please read the following statements and indi-
cate how many are true.’ The baseline statements were as follows: (1) I believe
my development agency should focus more on HIV/AIDS reduction globally.
(2) I think all development agencies should establish priority countries. (3) I
believe that OECD countries should take a backseat to south–south cooperation.
(4) I believe that too much development aid is currently spent in Africa.
31. Based on a uniform prior over the [0,1] interval, the 95% credible interval is
[0.18,0.73].
32. The ‘International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006’.
33. The remaining reported changes came about because the government did not
meet specific performance targets required for the release of budget support;
therefore, it would be incorrect to classify them as an aid suspension.
34. See Table A6 in Appendix for a complete list of the 39 cases where aid was
suspended and data on how each suspension was coded.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR
Haley J. Swedlund is assistant professor at the Centre for Conflict Analysis and
Management, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University. Her
book, The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients Negotiate the Delivery of
Foreign Aid is forthcoming with Cornell University Press in 2017.
REFERENCES
Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000) ‘Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?’ Jour-
nal of Economic Growth 5(1): 33–63.
478
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Arel-Bundock, V., Atkinson, J. and Potter, R. A. (2015) ‘The limits of foreign aid
diplomacy: how bureaucratic design shapes aid distribution’, International
Studies Quarterly 59(3): 544–56.
Azam, J.-P. and Laffont, J.-J. (2003) ‘Contracting for aid’, Journal of Development
Economics 70(1): 25–58.
Baldwin, D. A. (2000) ‘The sanctions debate and the logic of choice’, International
Security 24: 80–107.
Bapat, N. A. and Kwon, B. R. (2015) ‘When are sanctions effective? A bargaining
and enforcement framework’, International Organization 69(01): 131–62.
Baylies, C. (1995) ‘Political conditionality’ and democratisation’, Review of African
Political Economy 22(65): 321–37.
Bermeo, S. B. (2011) ‘Foreign aid and regime change: a role for donor intent’,
World Development 39(11): 2021–31.
Berthelemy, J.-C. and Tichit, A. (2004) ‘Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions: a
three-dimensional panel analysis’, International Review of Economics & Finance
13(3): 253–74.
Blair, G. and Imai, K. (2012) ‘Statistical analysis of list experiments’, Political Anal-
ysis 20(1): 47–77.
Bodenstein, T. and Faust, J. (2014) ‘Who cares? Public opinion on political con-
ditionality in foreign aid’, ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, 3–6
September, 2014.
Br€autigam, D. (2000) Aid Dependence and Governance, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wik-
sell International.
Br€autigam, D. and Knack, S. (2004) ‘Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in
sub-Saharan Africa’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 52(2): 255–85.
Brown, S. (2005) ‘Foreign aid and democracy promotion: lessons from Africa’, The
European Journal of Development Research 17(2): 179–98.
Brown, S. (2011) ‘Well, what can you expect? Donor officials’ apologetics for
hybrid regimes in Africa’, Democratization 18(2): 512–34.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Smith, A. (2010) ‘Leader survival, revolutions, and the
nature of government finance’, American Journal of Political Science 54(4): 936–50.
Bullock, W., Imai, K. and Shapiro, J. N. (2011) ‘Statistical analysis of endorsement
experiments: measuring support for militant groups in Pakistan’, Political
Analysis 19(4): 363–84.
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2000) ‘Aid, policies, and growth’, American Economic
Review 90(4): 847–68.
Bush, S. (2015) The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does
Not Confront Dictators, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carey, S. C. (2007) ‘European aid: human rights versus bureaucratic Inertia?’
Journal of Peace Research 44(4): 447–64.
Carothers, T. and de Gramont, D. (2013) Development Aid Confronts Politics: The
Almost Revolution, Baltimore, MD: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Claessens, S., Cassimon, D. and Van Campenhout, B. (2009) ‘Evidence on changes
in aid allocation criteria’, The World Bank Economic Review 23(2): 185–208.
Clist, P. (2011) ‘25 years of aid allocation practice: whither selectivity?’ World
Development 39(10): 1724–34.
Clist, P., Isopi, A. and Morrissey, O. (2012) ‘Selectivity on aid modality: determi-
nants of budget support from multilateral donors’, The Review of International
Organizations 7(3): 267–84.
479
SWEDLUND: ARE AID SUSPENSION THREATS CREDIBLE?
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Collier, P. (1997) ‘The failure of conditionality’, in C. Gwin and J. M. Nelson (eds)
Perspectives on Aid and Development, Washington, DC: Overseas Development
Council; Distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 51–78
Collier, P., Guillaumont, P., Guillaumont, S. and Gunning, J. W. (1997) ‘Re-
designing conditionality’,World Development 25(9): 1399–407.
Cornell, A. (2014) ‘Why bureaucratic stability matters for the implementation of
democratic governance programs’, Governance 27(2): 191–214.
Crawford, G. (1997) ‘Foreign aid and political conditionality: issues of effective-
ness and consistency’, Democratization 4(3): 69–108.
de Felice, D. (2015) ‘Diverging visions on political conditionality: the role of
domestic politics and international socialization in French and British aid’,
World Development 75: 26–45.
de la Croix, D. and Delavallade, C. (2013) ‘Why corrupt governments may receive
more foreign aid’, Oxford Economic Papers 66(1): 51–66.
DfID. (2008) Development: Making in Happen, 2008 Annual Report, London: The Sta-
tionery Office.
DfID. (2011) Department for International Development: Annual Report and Accounts
2010-11, London: The Stationery Office.
Dietrich, S. (2013) ‘Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in foreign
aid allocation’, International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 698–712.
Dietrich, S. and Wright, J. (2015) ‘Foreign aid allocation tactics and democratic
change in Africa’, Journal of Politics 77(1): 216–34.
Dollar, D. and Levin, V. (2006) ‘The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–
2003’,World Development 34(12): 2034–46.
Dollar, D. and Svensson, J. (2000) ‘What explains the success or failure of struc-
tural adjustment programmes?’ The Economic Journal 110(466): 894–917.
Drezner, D. W. (2003) ‘The hidden hand of economic coercion’, International Orga-
nization 57(3): 643–59.
Dunning, T. (2004) ‘Conditioning the effects of aid: cold war politics, donor credi-
bility, and democracy in Africa’, International Organization 58(02): 409–23.
Easterly, W. (2008) Reinventing Foreign Aid, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Easterly, W. and Williamson, C. R. (2011) ‘Rhetoric versus reality: the best and
worst of aid agency practices’,World Development 39(11): 1930–49.
Faust, J. and Koch, S. (2014) ‘Foreign aid and the domestic politics of European bud-
get support’,Discussion Paper No 21/2014, Bonn: German Development Institute.
Fisher, J. (2015) ‘‘Does it work?’ – work for whom? Britain and political condition-
ality since the cold War’,World Development 75: 13–25.
Freytag, A. and Pehnelt, G. (2009) ‘Debt relief and governance quality in develop-
ing countries’,World Development 37(1): 62–80.
Gibson, C. C., Andersson, K., Ostrom, E. and Shivakumar, S. (2005) The Samaritan’s
Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldsmith, A. A. (2001) ‘Foreign aid and statehood in Africa’, International Orga-
nization 55(1): 123–48.
Government of Denmark. (2012) The International Development Cooperation Act.
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Danida/About-
Danida/Legal/Lov ENGELSK.pdf
Government of Ireland. (2012) Interim Report by Evaluation and Audit Unit Technical
Team to Secretary General on Misappropriation of Funds in the Office of the Prime
Minister, Uganda. https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/news
press/publications/2012-Uganda-PRDP-audit-Interim-Report.pdf
Gulrajani, N. (2015) ‘Dilemmas in donor design: organisational reform and the future
of foreign aid agencies’, Public Administration and Development 35(2): 152–164.
480
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Hackenesch, C. (2015) ‘It’s domestic politics, stupid! EU democracy promotion
strategies meet African dominant party regimes’,World Development 75: 85–96.
Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L. and Tierney, M. J., eds. (2006) Delegation
and Agency in International Organizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hook, S. W. (1998) ‘Building democracy’ through foreign aid: the limitations of
United States political conditionalities, 1992–96’, Democratization 5(3): 156–80.
Hout, W. (2007) The Politics of Aid Selectivity: Good Governance Criteria in World
Bank, U.S. and Dutch Development Assistance, New York: Routledge.
Hudson, J. and Mosley, P. (2001) ‘Aid policies and growth: in search of the holy
grail’, Journal of International Development 13(7): 1023–38.
Hufbauer, G., Schott, J. and Elliott, K. A. (1990) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: His-
tory and Current Policy, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Hyde, S. D. (2015) ‘Experiments in international relations: lab, survey, and field’,
Annual Review of Political Science 18(1): 403–24.
Jablonski, R. S. (2014) ‘How aid targets votes: the impact of electoral incentives on
foreign aid distribution’,World Politics 66(2): 1–39.
Jeanne, D. and Njoroge, J. (2012) ‘Donors cut all direct aid to government until 2013’,
Daily Monitor, December 4; accessed at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/
National/Donors–cut–all-direct-aid–government–until-2015/688334-1635792-
tillgq/index.html
Kersting, E. and Kilby, C. (2014) ‘Aid and democracy redux’, European Economic
Review 67: 125–43.
Killick, T. (1998) Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, London: Overseas
Development Institute.
Koch, S. (2015) ‘A typology of political conditionality beyond aid: conceptual hori-
zons based on lessons from the European Union’,World Development 75: 97–108.
Koeberle, S., Stavreski, Z., andWalliser, J., eds. (2006) Budget Support asMore Effective
Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Kuklinski, J. H., Sniderman, P. M., Knight, K., Piazza, T., Tetlock, P. E., Lawrence,
G. R. and Mellers, B. (1997) ‘Racial prejudice and attitudes toward affirmative
action’, American Journal of Political Science 41(2): 402.
Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chi-
cago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lancaster, C. and Van Dusen, A. (2005) Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Lavrakas, P. J. 2014) ‘List-experiment technique’, in Encyclopedia of Survey Research
Methods, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 433–5.
Lebovic, J. H. 2005) ‘Donor positioning: development assistance from the U.S.,
Japan, France, Germany, and Britain’, Political Research Quarterly 58(1): 119–26.
Lebovic, J. H. and Voeten, E. (2009) ‘The cost of shame: international organiza-
tions and foreign aid in the punishing of human rights violators’, Journal of
Peace Research 46(1): 79–97.
Martens, B. (2002) The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Milner, H. V. and Tingley, D., eds. (2013) The Geopolitics of Foreign Aid, Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar.
Molenaers, N. (2012) ‘The great divide? Donor perceptions of budget support, eli-
gibility and policy dialogue’, Third World Quarterly 33(5): 37–41.
Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S. and Faust, J. (2015) ‘Political conditionality and for-
eign aid’,World Development 75: 2–12.
Molenaers, N., Gagiano, A. K., Smets, L. and Dellepiane, S. (2015) ‘What deter-
mines the suspension of budget support?’World Development 75: 62–73.
481
SWEDLUND: ARE AID SUSPENSION THREATS CREDIBLE?
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Morrison, K. M. (2007) ‘Natural resources, aid, and democratization: a best-case
scenario’, Public Choice 131(3–4): 365–86.
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J. and Toye, J. (1995) Aid and Power: The World Bank and Pol-
icy-Based Lending, Vol. 1. London: Routledge.
Nielsen, R. A. (2013) ‘Rewarding human rights? Selective aid sanctions against
repressive states’, International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 791–803.
Nielson, D. L. and Tierney, M. J. (2009) ‘International organization foundation
delegation to international organization: agency theory and World Bank envi-
ronmental reform’, International Organizations 57(2): 241–76.
Ostrom, E., Gibson, C., Shivakumar, S. and Andersson, K. (2002) ‘Aid, incentives,
and sustainability: an institutional analysis of development cooperation’,
Technical Report, Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm.
https://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/37356956.pdf.
Pape, R. A. (1998) ‘Why economic sanctions still do not work’, International Secu-
rity 23(1): 66–77.
Peterson, T. M. (2013) ‘Sending a message: the reputation effect of US sanction
threat behavior’, International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 672–82.
Regan, P. M. (1995) ‘U.S. economic aid and political repression: an empirical eval-
uation of U.S. foreign policy’, Political Research Quarterly 48(3): 613–28.
Reinsberg, B. (2015) ‘Foreign Aid responses to political liberalization’, World
Development 75: 46–61.
Reuters. (2014) ‘U.S. Cuts Aid to Uganda, Cancels military exercise over anti-gay
law’, June 19, accessed at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-uganda-
gay-announcement-idUSKBN0EU26N20140619.
Schneider, C. J. and Tobin, J. L. (2013) ‘Interest coalitions and multilateral aid allo-
cation in the European Union’, International Studies Quarterly 57(1): 103–14.
Schraeder, P. J., Hook, S. W. and Taylor, B. (1998) ‘Clarifying the foreign aid puz-
zle: a comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows’,
World Politics 50(02): 294–323.
Simensen, J. (2007) ‘Writing the history of development Aid’, Scandinavian Journal
of History 32(2): 167–82.
Smith, A. (2008) ‘The perils of unearned income’, The Journal of Politics 70(3): 780–93.
Sorensen, G., ed. (1993) Political Conditionality, Oxon: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
Reprinted by Routledge in 2003.
Stokke, O., ed. (1995) Aid and Political Conditionality, Oxon: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
Reprinted by Routledge in 2006.
Streb, M. J., Burrell, B., Frederick, B. and Genovese, M. a. (2008) ‘Social desirability
effects and support for a female American president’, Public Opinion Quarterly
72(1): 76–89.
Svensson, J. (2000) ‘Foreign aid and rent-seeking’, Journal of International Econom-
ics 51(2): 437–61.
Svensson, J. (2006) ‘The institutional economics of Foreign Aid’, Swedish Economic
Policy Review 13: 115–37.
Swedlund, H. J. (2017) The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients Negotiate
the Delivery of Aid, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Swedlund, H. J. (2013) ‘From donorship to ownership? Budget support and donor
influence in Rwanda and Tanzania’, Public Administration and Development 33
(5): 357–70.
Swedlund, H. J. (2014) ‘Assessing the promises of budget support: case study evi-
dence from Rwanda’, in M. Ndulo and N. van de Walle (eds) Problems, Prom-
ises, and Paradoxes of Aid, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press,
pp. 238–64.
482
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 2
3:5
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
Tierney, M. J., Nielson, D. L., Hawkins, D. G., Roberts, Jns., Findley, M. G.,
Powers, R. M., Parks, B., Wilson, S. E. and Hicks, R. L. (2011) ‘More dollars
than sense: refining our knowledge of development finance using aid data’,
World Development 39(11): 1891–1906.
Tsebelis, G. (1995) ‘Decision making in political systems: veto players in presiden-
tialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’, British Journal
of Political Science 25(3): 289.
Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
van de Walle, N. (2001) African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–
1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winters, M. S. and Martinez, G. (2015) ‘The role of governance in determining for-
eign aid flow composition’,World Development 66: 516–31.
Wright, J. and Winters, M. (2010) ‘The politics of effective foreign aid’, Annual
Review of Political Science 13(1): 61–80.
Younas, J. (2008) ‘Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: altruism or trade ben-
efits’, European Journal of Political Economy 24(3): 661–74.
APPENDIX
Table A1. Description of sample.
Country
ODA as a %GNI
(2000–2011)
HoCs
sampled
HoCs
participating
Response
rate
1st wave Ghana 9.20% 15 10 67%
Mozambique 25.00% 21 10 48%
Uganda 13.28% 15 8 53%
Rwanda 19.98% 14 11 79%
Tanzania 12.76% 21 11 52%
2nd wave Burundi 28.31% 10 6 60%
Ethiopia 13.86% 16 7 44%
Guinea 7.09% 7 5 71%
Mauritania 13.53% 8 4 50%
Zambia 15.04% 15 7 47%
3rd wave Sierra Leone 30.37% 6 3 50%
Niger 13.57% 12 5 42%
Comoros 9.10% 4 2 50%
Liberia 73.38% 6 5 83%
Malawi 20.62% 8 6 75%
4th wave Togo 7.20% 5 2 40%
Chad 8.59% 6 2 33%
Congo, Republic 6.92% 5 3 60%
Ivory Coast 3.76% 7 2 29%
Kenya 4.53% 14 5 36%
Total 215 114
Average 53%
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Table A2. Donor agencies represented in the sample by type.
Ministerial
bilaterals (35)
Non-ministerial
bilaterals (42) Multilaterals (37)
Belgium (3) Australia (2) African Development Bank (10)
Canada (1) Austria (3) European Union (12)
Denmark (5) France (10) UNDP (9)
Finland (2) Italy (4) World Bank (6)
Germany (7) Japan (7)
Ireland (6) Korea (3)
Netherlands (4) Norway (3)
Sweden (4) Spain (2)
United Kingdom (3) Switzerland (4)
United States (4)
Table A3. Estimated proportion of HoCs who would not suspend aid even in the
case of severe political repression (difference in means estimator).
Baseline condition
mean (s.e.)
Test condition
mean (s.e.)
Percent ‘not
suspend’
1.2 (.13) 1.7 (.18) 45% (.22)
N D 47 48 p D .021
Table A4. Test of the no design effect assumption (Blair and Imai 2012).
Est. S.e.
pi(y D 0, t D 1) 0.0674 0.0819
pi(y D 1, t D 1) 0.1166 0.1016
pi(y D 2, t D 1) 0.1653 0.0704
pi(y D 3, t D 1) 0.0833 0.0399
pi(y D 4, t D 1) 0.0208 0.0206
pi(y D 0, t D 0) 0.1667 0.0538
pi(y D 1, t D 0) 0.2451 0.0949
pi(y D 2, t D 0) 0.1751 0.0938
pi(y D 3, t D 0) ¡0.0195 0.0535
pi(y D 4, t D 0) ¡0.0208 0.0206
H0: No design effect.
Bonferroni-corrected p-value 0.5418
Note: This statistical test is designed to detect potential violations of the assumption that the
inclusion of a sensitive item has no effect on respondents’ answers to control items, which
may arise if respondents evaluate the control items relative to the sensitive item. For a full
explanation of the method, see Blair and Imai (2012, Section 3.1, pp. 63–5).
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Table A5. Characteristics of baseline and treatment groups in list experiment.
Baseline (N D 47) Test condition (N D 48)
Type of agency Multilaterals 18 17
Bilaterals 29 31
Language of survey English 41 41
French 6 7
Colonial history Anglophone 29 27
Francophone 14 17
Lusophone 4 4
Mean length in office 23.8 months 25.5 months
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